Rainbow Nation: the place where, finally, each band of color chromatically harmonizes with all others while retaining its own distinctiveness-the South Africa of this nation-building slogan is one preaching difference alchemically harmonized by natural law. Such a law, according to which each group, each constituency, each colloquy, is automatically rendered complementary to all others, is a law worthy of the utopian moment of nation building. It is a law also of discovery, proclaiming that each may discover in an instant its hidden principle of complementarity with all others. This law can be understood as a replacement for the former system of laws -the apartheid racial estates -which predicated life on the necessary failure of complementarity, on the disjunction of color bands. This rainbow is preferable to the tornado that preceded it, even if it remains within the ambit of racialism, giving predominance within the new nation to differences based on color. And South Africa remains mired in huge dif- 
lying pattern of commonalities and you remove any way of locating their differences. You remove the possibility of their having differences. Davidson's (which I have pared down to the minimum) is an argument against radical incommensurability of belief, an argument about radical relativism. So far, so good. However, Davidson's argument says nothing about whether, in a particular circumstance, A and B will have enough in common to be able to communicate their differences, each to the other, with the right level of subtlety and perspicacity. Sufficient unto the day are the means, and all hangs on whether, in this context or that -for this purpose or that -enough is shared between humans to allow them to communicate "successfully."
The concept of "successful communication" or "genuine communication"
is context-bound. It is also a concept about which persons may, in this context or that, disagree -one believing (a father, say) that communication has been most successful, while the other (a son, say) believing the opposite. South Africa is a society beset, as I have said, by significant problems in communication. A goal of our social transformation is to enhance levels of communication, thus allowing human diversity to become an object of acknowledgment. But for that to happen, people must become more alike through processes of democratization and globalization. A middle class must develop between former masters and former servants, and become ever more inclusive of the population. New values of respect and discovery must be inculcated. New styles of conversation must become normalized in a society whose forms of politeness can mask sullenness and silence. The society must develop political styles of multiparty communication. Etc., etc.-for one is speaking of a change in the map of things, in an overall topography.
In what follows, I want to discuss one particular aspect of postapartheid South Africa that is relevant to my training as a philosopher: the importance of "reversal. " What I mean should become clearer as I review the philosophical history of this concept, something I bother to do in order to approach the way reversal has been rendered thematic in South African cultural forms since the collapse of the apartheid state in 1991. I shall approach these matters, however, gradually, beginning with limitations in what is otherwise wonderful writing by Richard Rorty. Given that these writings depend on American cultural forms, my discussion will also range over American terrain. Rorty thinks of moral communication hinging on what he calls "solidarity." A leftist of the old Roosevelt/ liberal variety, with deep instincts for human dignity and a healthy skepticism about the appeal to philosophical principles that might be believed to legitimate his beliefs, Rorty is communalist to the core. The bottom line for ethical justifications is for him nothing other than the "we, " the community of believers in solidarity. "When I have reached bedrock," in Wittgenstein's famous
phrase, "my spade is turned," and at that moment of appeal -when appeal to every reason has been given, appeal to every practice shown -if an alien community remains unconvinced, there is little else to do. Solidarity becomes the epistemological framework in terms of which ethics must be thought (rather than as a matter of a universally binding principle, as in the pages of Kant), and solidarity becomes as well the metaphor for the good ethical fight.
Solidarity is moreover the metaphor for the encounter with diversity, the bringing of others into community with oneself. As Rorty says:
The right way to take the slogan "we have obligations to human beings simply as such" is as a means of reminding ourselves to keep trying to expand the sense of "us" as far as we can. That slogan urges us to extrapolate further in the direction set by certain events in the past-the inclusion among "us" of the . . . unbelievers beyond the seas (and perhaps, last of all, the menials who, all this time, have been doing our dirty work). This is a process we should try to keep going. . . . We should try to notice our similarities with them. The right way to construe the slogan is as urging us to create a more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently have. The wrong way is to think of it as urging us to recognize such a solidarity, as something that exists antecedently to our recognition of it. 2 The inclusive stance of solidarity which places the other inside the domain of one's community is a precondition, Rorty believes, of recognition and conversation between persons. We have, Rorty argues, no alternative to solidarity. To view others as human beings is already, he believes, to see them as part of us, subject to our beliefs and attitudes, interpreted as we interpret. And that is to subsume them within our view of things.
There is something obvious and right about this picture, and also something fishy. What is right is that, given the failure of transcendental rationalism, I have no way of shedding my own community's interpretive skin -of stepping, once and for all, outside it and viewing outsiders in accord with some more abstract, superhuman principle. process by which a univocal community absorbs them in a nonnegotiable way. This does occur sometimes, and when it does it is very important to note the fact. Still, it often happens that some kind of negotiation or change may involve both parties in the course of solidarities achieved, and what is fishy about Rorty's picture of communication is the thought that bedrock is hit typically. This is Rorty's picture: I have my beliefs, you have yours, and I ineluctably bring you under my moral scheme in calling you a human being and listening to you, as you do to me.
We each, as it were, cannibalize the other, subsuming the other under our own conceptual schemes without any disturbance to those schemes. Under these circumstances it is hard to imagine how anyone would get anywhere, since each in effect annihilates the other by humanizing the other according to the idea that each has of the human.
As often as not, though, neither of us has such totally inflexible beliefs that a tribal boundary can be sharply drawn around each of our belief systems. This is so especially for the reason that, as often as not, there is no "we" that is, as a community, free of fundamental dispute, nor a "they" that is, at least not any longer, univocal in belief. In the formation of South African solidarity, there was no already given "we" that assimilated outsiders to its national scope. Rather, a "we" was created that caused all parties to the new South African democracy to articulate themselves, with respect to each other, in its wake and in its context. That "we" remains a mass of conflicting images and ideas, styles and attitudesto the point where communication is often hardly possible. Given which, one can hardly speak of a "South African community" on communitarian grounds. The lesson that Rorty teaches seems to evaporate when he turns to encounters between "communities." It has been noted often enough that Rorty's is a kind of proverbially American picture, since it stresses diversity on the liberal inside of America and then, suddenly, a univocal stance directed at "the outsider," who should, and will, be assimilated to "our point of view." It is the position of immigrants who come to America, change their names, and become "one of us." This is melting-pot liberalism at its best, and worst.
"You are one of us," the colonizer says (in fantasy, after the fact) to the colonized. Such fantasies or metaphors of subsuming ("you are one of us now, since I see you that way") ripple through Rorty's way of setting out the hermeneutical issue of solidarity-while historically based moral concerns ought, for the liberal, to have urged otherwise. If it is a precondition of conversation that the other be rendered internal to one's own community, then perhaps conversation is not what is wanted. "In order for you to talk with me and express your difference, you must become part of me" is what the stance may appear to offer others, and the other's prior experience of being colonized may make the price of admission seem too high. The voice of the master may echo subtly in Rorty's language: he urges fellow liberals to "expand our sense of 'us' as far as we can," to include
"among 'us' . . . the family in the next cave, . . . the unbelievers beyond the seas (and . . . the menials who, all this time, have been doing our dirty work)." 3 Crucial to the Rortian picture is that the "we" appears to remain stable throughout while the "you" changes (by being assimilated to the domain of the "we").
According to his picture, the community does not change in the ethical encounter:
instead it assimilates outsiders to its image of the human, thus humanizing them. This is the missionary position, hardly the image of a cultural tango. Well then, how much do the "you" and the "we" change? No doubt this is a contextual question with no general answer to be had.
But note that a different picture, one less centrally reliant on solidarity and more on the toleration induced by skepticism, has long been available. Montaigne's masterpiece "Of Cannibals" (1578-80) conceives the evaluation of even cannibalism as inviting self-scrutiny by the "I" about his own "we"; the "I" cultivating an attitude of inclusion (or exclusion) toward the other is not the question raised. Montaigne's is the first of two related, and partly competing, dialectical pictures of how to bring diversity to conversation -the other is Hegel's -and each is crucial to what may be termed the postmodern ethics of otherness.
This ethics is postmodern in that it eschews a single story about how the dialectics of communication happen, and instead takes the history of philosophy to have elaborated a number of different stories, each of which has its merits. Life, and so philosophy, exhibit a repertoire of (repeated but also competing) ways in which the dialectics of bringing diversity to communication take place. Just as life, and so philosophy, exhibit a number of ways in which impasses in communication and/or negotiation occur. The important feature of these competing pictures, those of Montaigne and Hegel (but not Rorty), is that both require a reversal to take place. The "we" and the "other" try on each other's position, and in doing so free themselves of former stories about themselves and others. Neither the "we" nor the "they" remains stable.
II
According to Montaigne, one does not say to the cannibal, "You are now an honorary bourgeois, come and eat at my table. " Nor does one begin by seeing him as a "human like us" if one wishes to take him seriously. The work of establishing likeness and humanity is more dialectical. It is a work through which the "I" changes its perspective on itself and on the "we" of which it is part, in the course of evolving a perspective on the cannibal. This work in turn leads to skeptical results about both the "I" and the "other." Montaigne refuses both the posture of European superiority over the cannibal and that of moral relativism regarding her, as well as the stance of what will much later be termed political correctness.
Montaigne is famously ahead of his time in suggesting that a community that fails to rethink itself in the encounter with the other is a community aiming for domination rather than understanding. While sticking to his own view that eating others cannot exactly be a good thing, just how bad it is remains deeply uncertain. "Bad with respect to what?" one must ask, realizing that there is no way of articulating a cultural criticism of the cannibal apart from a repertoire of comparisons. It is the received certainty of comparisons (between them and us) that becomes the subject of his attack, an attack performed in the form of a reversal.
The reversal is articulated as follows: cannibals are quite specific about whom they kill and devour. They kill only when they need to eat. By contrast, when Europeans wage war they engage in a rabid game of pillage, rape, and destruction against defenseless civilian populations, destroying in the process whole villages, towns, or communities. The cannibal is thereby placed on the same footing as the euro-tribes Montaigne lives among, while those tribes are placed where they belong: in the jungle of cannibals. This reversal of values accorded to self and other allows him to raise an essentially skeptical question about which is finally the worse. The European is worse, he hints, but it is only a hint; for Montaigne is as usual uncertain.
Montaigne's goal is hardly that of articulating a sense of solidarity with the cannibal. It is instead to show that we do not have the means to evaluate her. Diversity, having arisen, cannot be brought to articulation except in the form of doubt. And diversity has arisen only by means of a reversal: "they" are shown to be more like how "we" conceive of ourselves than "we" could allow ourselves to admit, while "we" are shown to be far more like our vision of "them" than "we" could similarly ever say. After the reversal, the "we" is left as uncertain as the "they." Neither is in prospective solidarity. Instead, the two are merely placed on the same footing, with further terms of comparison remaining to be worked out.
We do not assimilate them to us. Rather we, having been recognized to be more like them than formerly thought, exist in an opaque, somewhat borderless space, in which paths of similarity and difference between them and us remain unclear.
The consequence of this process is that we can recognize the strange inexplicability of the other's difference from us for the first time. Whatever they are, they are not of our community, and we do not know why they do what they do (habit, necessity?). But do we know why we do what we do (in the matter of waging eurowar)? It will take tomes of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud to confirm by their multiple and contradictory stories that we do not. Since we are now as uncertain of ourselves as we are of them, a new concept of humanity has arisen that links them with us in a shared state of uncertainty. If Rorty should decide to employ this new concept as a way of producing solidarity between his "them" and his "us, " there is no reason to balk.
Hegel's picture of reversal concerns, not the colonial encounter of self meeting an unknown other, but the struggle between persons caught up in interlocking shapes. In a famous passage in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel shows that the master and slave arrive as an ensemble. The master is master only through his colonization of the slave's capacity to work. The slave, utterly dependent, works for the master; the master, utterly independent, robs the slave of his capacity to enjoy the fruits of his own labor. Devaluing the slave to the level of mere material (workforce, machinery) for the production of the master's goods and the servicing of his enjoyments, the slave, disenfranchised from his incipient capacity to work for himself, becomes an appendage, a being that exists only for the other.
A resident of South Africa may be forgiven for seeing in this picture the modern history of his country. In 1913, the African was denied the right to own land, thus sending him reeling onto the roads and into the gold and diamond mines, and later, he was deprived of citizenship and most of his remaining rights.
This experience, and state, of being merely other to the other, of being one whose existence is controlled by the other and who works for him, is the essence, Hegel believes, of the slave's "phenomenology. " Its experience, Frantz Fanon will add, is that of abjection. The slave's own life has stopped, his culture has been disenfranchised and devalued: reduced to the status of a set of objects collectible by the museums of euro-tribes, in whose further history these objects then come to "live. " 4 Robbed of self-consciousness, the slave exists as an existential void for the master. The eyes of the master and his commands to the slave are omnipotent, as are the institutions of his regard (the museum, the colonial administrative system). Similarly, the narcissism of the master is expanded to the point of no return, since the slave, thus devalued, ceases to exist and becomes a mere shadow, whose bent and wizened figure cuts no force and attracts no attention, while the world is the master's oyster. A luxurious position: the master orders the slave about while simultaneously denying his existence. The master -or mistress -is thus free to spend time collecting silver, viewing animals in game parks, and driving about the malls of Johannesburg.
Reversal is prompted by history when, in the struggle for recognition, the master comes to realize that he is "slave to the slave" (other to the other), since he does no work and is nothing more than a pampered house cat who feeds on the work of the slave. In the master/slave configuration, all is dog eat dog, cannibal devour cannibal. Either I belong to you or you to me. As yet there is no
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comprehension of a third option by either party. So one can understand the deep anxiety that the master experiences when reversal takes place. He will see himself as swallowed and losing power, body image, ego boundaries. He may well emigrate; he will certainly turn, if only for a moment, resentful. He will be scared as hell. At the moment of reversal, the slave in turn learns to recognize that he has power over the master because the slave has a skill. The slave's dawning recognition that he is master to the master causes him (as Kojève puts it) to desire the master's desire. What the slave wants is that he too come to view his labor as a form of culture, expression, and production that will be for him to enjoy and recognize himself in: the slave wants the master's élan vital, his sense of will and consummation. Since it is the master who knows how to desire, enjoy, and recognize, the slave needs to learn this art of self-empowerment and fulfillment. He can only do so -and here is the great advance of Hegelian epistemology -by internalizing the state of mind, the mentality, of the master in a way that adapts it as his own. Thus the slave cannot kill the master because the slave requires the master's blessing or birthright or recognition. The slave needs the master as a model to imitate, and this must occur while the master is himself changing.
However, the slave cannot take up the art of self-recognition in the way it has been practiced by the master, for the slave is already different from him: the slave has a skill and consequently a different attitude toward life. Unless things fall apart, the slave's imitation will be creative and add novelties to the historical world. But pace Hegel, history does not assure the success of its outcome.
III
This Hegelian story of modernity has a happy ending in reconciliation, because each party, having recognized that the other has what it lacks itself, becomes like the other, and so completes itself. As each becomes like the other, taking onto itself the other's best aspects, those aspects change. The bourgeois revolutions (French, American) take place, and the glorious assertion of universal human rights is politically enunciated (for the Christian, European male, in any case).
With this annunciation, recognition will come in the form of law. The master will accede to the slave's claim to be the owner of his own labor -a labor for himself, not for the other. A new dispensation of rights will come into being. At the same time communication becomes possible because each is now more like the other and each, under the new regime of respect, listens to the other. At the end of history, they become co-citizens of a nation, the "I that is we," able fully to communicate because finally the same people. Hegel's is an Enlightenment fantasy, one that obviates the problem of diversity altogether. Still, its lesson about the importance of a dialectic in establishing the means of communication should be remembered. For what the Hegelian story of truth and reconciliation can offer
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is this caveat: reconciliation requires more than the giving of testimony or the construction of a supportable self-image and an accurate memory. Reconciliation requires more than redress, the redistribution of wealth, or even the apportioning of blame and punishment. It also requires more than cultural reconstitution (at least of the kind urged on us in South Africa by President Mbeki's pan-Africanist "renaissance"). Reconciliation demands reversal, with all of the epistemological and historical complexity that that process involves. The master must undergo the rigors of reversal, rigors that tend to produce (in Montaigne's sense) skeptical conclusions. And the slave must learn the master's art of self-recognition, though in the former slave's own way and according to his or her own history and social style.
Much was said during the 1990s in South Africa about producing a culture of reconciliation, especially in the first few years of the postapartheid state, which is my immediate concern. Nelson Mandela, the first president of the new nation, tossed a rugby ball as a gesture of national unity, and was cheered. The rains came to the parched landscape of the Karoo and ended with a luminescent rainbow that, by some act of national prestidigitation, spread mysteriously east and west, north and south, to both seas, and led to our reigning image of a Rainbow Nation. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission made great strides toward revising the past, documenting it for the archive and instituting an agenda of reconciliation through testimony, memory, moral work. But such events hardly defined the complexity of South African social life, much of which had, and still has, little to do with reconciliation. It might be said that J. M. Coetzee's 1998 novel Disgrace is a meditation on the gap between reconciliation and disgrace in both urban and rural South Africa. Coetzee's book is about reversal without reconciliation, indeed with its opposite. In the novel we become them and they become us, but in the terms of its allegory the process amounts to cannibalization: either we swallow everything that you are, or you swallow us. Disgrace is an excellent argument for emigration. It points to the importance of how reversal happens for the decency of a country. Coetzee's society is one in which the proud events of the new nation-its laws, its rhetoric, its moments of transitional To say that master and slave must change places if reconciliation is to eventuate (and disgrace to be avoided) is to speak the language of dialectical necessity -a precipitous language inviting counterexamples. Is it not imaginable that a master/slave couple or something very like it could achieve reconciliation without reversal ever happening? What kind of necessity is this exactly, the one connecting reconciliation to reversal? First, reversal does not automatically lead to Herwitz • Peace and Mind reconciliation, and may never do so. It may lead, for example, to a new kind of disgrace. Second, the scope of reconciliation should not be exaggerated, since it is interconnected with almost every other process at work in transitional societies: I refer to processes of class formation and reformation, to the growth of the welfare state, of education, globalization, and the like. Such forces open space for new kinds of relationships. Reconciliation, and by extension reversal, are but two among many concepts relevant to the analysis of societies in transition -relevant to their analysis, that is, from the perspective of justice. However, third: reconciliation, and by extension reversal, are crucial concepts in such analyses because the coherence of any explanation of the way in which people remove themselves from the grip of the past depends on an understanding of processes that are not only social and political but also psychological and (perhaps above all) epistemic. For these, to the best of anyone's knowledge, involve role reversal within epistemic systems of beliefs and desires.
IV
Given the anxiety internal to the moment of reversal, it is natural that its manifestation in art and culture tends to happen in the form of comedy. Comedy eases us into the terror of role reversals, leads us to suspect that something good can come out of it, and projects that good in a way that mostly avoids the hard issues the terms of their marriage by subjecting it to the dynamics of a courtroom case, in which they find themselves on opposite sides. In the course of the trial, she stands both procedure and her husband on their heads, wins the case, proves her point-that men and women are entitled to the same treatment under the lawand nearly loses her husband, who enters into a sulk of biblical proportions.
Toward the end of the film this exemplary pair stands on the brink of divorce.
The two differ, it seems, only by the little extras attached to the ends of
their pet names -Pinky has a y at the end of his, while Pinkie his wife sports an ie at the end of hers. Their names are so alike that when, in a spillover of private life into public drama, the discombobulated Adam calls her by her pet name instead of addressing her as the defense, the court reporter has to ask twice for its correct spelling. "Is that Pinky with a y or an ie?" the reporter drawls in his bored New York accent. Evidently it is easy to get these endings confused, even if men and women are supposed to be -and especially in the socially distant past of the 1930s were taken to be -as indelibly different as East from West, black from white, the rock of Gibraltar from the island of Santo Domingo, elite from subaltern. Adam is a definite rock, and no film audience could possibly have con- Both Adam and Amanda believe in the principle of equality before the law, yet each reserves the right to twist that principle to suit his or her purpose. Adam believes the principle to happily coexist with those categorical rules that distinguish one sex from the other: "I like there to be two sexes," he says. Amanda is less happy about this matter and reserves the right to bend both the law and courtroom procedure when this issue is at stake. As she claims it is in the case of Doris Attinger, who has shot at her philandering husband and his "tall blonde job" of a girlfriend, one Beryl Kane (no relation to Citizen). Attinger, Amanda convinces the jury, is not guilty of any crime, since (1) she shot out only to warn her husband off of his philandering and reconstitute her family, and since (2) no one was fatally hurt in the act. In the course of her argument, Amanda demonstrates to the jury that it is only an "unwritten principle" that allows a man the right to protect his family by force, and that once this principle is applied equally to women, Attinger will be found not guilty. Adam is disgusted both with the argument and with Amanda's legal shenanigans, believing that the law can admit of no special circumstance: when a person shoots, he or she breaks the law, end of story, straight conviction.
Adam gets his own back when, after losing the case and also, it appears, the marriage, he returns in the guise of a male Doris Attinger, gun in hand, ready to shoot at Amanda and her spineless friend Kip, just as Doris had done at her hubby and his blonde afternoon companion. At which point Amanda cries out that he has no right, that no one has the right to break the law. "Music to my together. It will take the remainder of the film for him to realize that he can respect what she has done, even if it will never sit easily with him, and that their relationship must be one of equals who have the right to differ. He will come to realize it because he desires her, because he likes her, because he wants to be with her. The dawning of recognition is precipitated by his desire, and catalyzed by her response.
The principle of equality is shown in this film to depend on the acknowledgment of difference -on the right of each to differ in belief from the other.
But the acknowledgment of this right to differ, so the film suggests, requires that the special accord or unity the pair experiences as intimacy or romantic love be made flexible enough to accommodate these differences. The straw that has broken Amanda's back is Adam's sweet-talking of her, which to her has proven, once too many times, that the intimacy he feels for her in private does not cash itself out in public. Quite the contrary. The public man becomes a man who condescends to her in private, hence her need to force the issue of his public, sexist, legalistic postures -if for no other reason than to demonstrate to him that she will not abide its correlate in private: his paternalism. When he becomes the public man, she suffers as the private woman: he breaks their intimacy apart without knowing it, without knowing her. She moreover takes a public stance in the name of the American liberation of women, a challenge to the written law in the name of the unwritten one. But Cavell was right to title his book Pursuits of Happiness, for the great stride in the American Declaration of Independence was to
link the achievement of rights to happiness, and it is Adam's right (as a man to deny her rights) that is denying Amanda happiness. What justifies, after all, the achievement of rights if not the pursuit of human flourishing and human pleasure? (God, the alternate avenue of justification, plays little role in this film, as does anything as abstract as "the appeal to reason.") Amanda has no alternative but to force the issue, for Adam has already forced it by falling into the norms and practices of the time, norms that prevent the new woman from becoming, as they say in the U.S. Army, "all she can be."
The acknowledgment of equality requires the acknowledgment of divergence. Even when -perhaps it should be said, especially when-the pair is otherwise so close. And these acknowledgments constitute no easy task. For Adam, a man content to move between private intimacy and public maleness, there does not seem to be any problem. He is in the position of master. Amanda believes what he believes and when they differ, as they obviously do about the Attinger case, there is always a new hat to be bought, in order to buy her off. For Amanda, in the position of slave (a slave from the upper crust), his little gesture is a big one, for everything is at stake in it both for their marriage and for the fate of women in general. The issue is the same for each of them: the capacity of their unity, their oneness in feeling, to cash itself out as oneness in belief. They will never quite agree, even at the end, as no two people coming from two distinctive histories (one female, the other male) -even if also from one shared history (American, upper-crust) -ever will. So the terms of belief will have to become those of mutual respect and support, of more than half believing each other. Each, in convincing the other that she or he has a point, will find her-or himself in a slight contradiction, since the composite of things they end up believing does not quite add up. The project of this film is to show, therefore, that the capacity for each to come to acknowledgment of the other requires overcoming the Adamic law that decrees that the two sexes are categorically different, while also requiring that each acknowledge that, without law, there can be no equality. Law: you can't live with it, you can't bust it apart. When unwritten laws go up against written ones, a variety of positions (his and hers) are both plausible, and the system of constitutional values, if I can call it that, breaks down into a number of incompatible, yet plausible, alternatives. It is here that written law gives way to judgment. The judge is a weak, quasi-comic character in this film so that the unre- The accountant tells them that if they leave now, "It'll cost ya." Amanda replies that "the more we pay, the more we like it"-a homily whose purpose is to signal her return to the world of delight but also to the title of their already screened silent home movie: "The More the Merrier" and "the more we like it" echo off each other, as if silent and sound film are suddenly in harmony. Later that night, together again, in their dream world a happy couple, we are treated to another silent demonstration, one that is about the prior and casts it in a most
peculiar light. Adam opens his mail and exclaims that he has been invited to run for a local seat of government on the Republican ticket. Amanda says that she is very proud of him, to which he responds that he would rather hear that than anything. She then puts on the hat that has become the symbol of her power and their recent history, sits down on the bed in a beguiling, Chinese kind of manner, which he does not yet see but we do, and wonders aloud: "Adam, have they picked the Democratic candidate yet?" "You wouldn't," he replies. "How do you know?" she responds. "I'd cry," he says, "and then you wouldn't." She quizzically asks, "But those were real tears?"-meaning back in the office. " 'Course they were," he says, "but I can turn them on any time I want." As he says this, the camera closes in on Spencer Tracy's wide and gleaming Irish eye, which gradually occasions from itself the eruption of a single golden tear, then another, then a small but veritable stream, which is then turned off more or less at will. It is no surprise that this consummate Tracy performance carries the effect of a consummation, since the slow, inexorable, and excited forcing of a single magnified drop, then another from his quivering eye, replicates the pleasure of the male orgasm. Nor will it, therefore, come as a surprise that both partners find Tracy's, that is Adam's, that is Pinky's, performance unnerving and exciting. One might think of it as a sophisticated kind of foreplay: "Oh yes, there aren't any of us don't have our little tricks, you know. " Amanda responds with her usual aplomb: "Men, women, the same." "The same, huh?" "Well maybe a little difference." And, finally, it will come as no surprise that the penultimate line of the film is given over to him. "Vive la différence!" he exclaims. She asks what that means, he says that it is French for "Hurrah for that little difference," at which point the curtain is drawn, they are removed from our sight, evidently to do the desired in the pursuit of happiness, and the film, the Punch-and-Judy show, ends. As it did in the silent home movie.
The thought that those tears, back then in the office, were not spontaneous but intended, a thought that remains unresolved, brings up the question of performance in those life moments that precisely call forth the conviction that comes from sheer spontaneity. Tracy's gesture, performed (mostly) in silence, is an acknowledgment that all the silence between the pair has been a kind of talk, a performance, a nonverbal communication in which each directs his or her sulk, eye solicitation, or hamming at the other -for the purpose of intimacy or its denial. (Between this pair, silence blurs the line that separates out hamming, acting, naturalness, and expression.) The demonstration that Adam gives Amanda is meant to suggest that he had more of a hand in bringing about this happy ending than had appeared -that he had willed and engineered it. But the production of tears at will is also meant, after the fact, to reinterpret that earlier moment in which his silence demanded (and received) the attention it deserved, and reinterpret it in a way that makes him feel more comfortable, and also powerful, now.
As if to say: "As I am doing now, so I did, or could have done, then." Adam is Herwitz • Peace and Mind trying on his silence as she tries on the hat he gave her, the hat that caused him grief when he found it on the head of the woman he was meant to prosecute (as if by prosecuting her, he was prosecuting all women, and in particular his own wife). What both husband and wife are convinced of is his sincerity now, and his ability to be comfortable in using the female role, in acting the female part when demanded.
What we have here is a representational moment that is also a moment of reiteration with a difference, and it both invites and compromises the authority of the one moment to be about the other. This is a film in which each iteration of its "meaning." Together, these recited lines become his. Together, they allow him to mean something, and mean something personally. They are addressed to her in particular, but also to what women, to him, simply are. He knows their difference by translating it -that is, by making it his, though without, finally, at the end of the film, seeking to marginalize it, to turn it into a mere rib of his own body and identity. The translation cannot be effected apart from desire, which does and does not make it a "real translation. " It is thus too real, filled with more than the "mere desire to translate." (Perhaps all translations, in virtue of being iterations, are a bit like this; but that is a further story.) Taken together, these final lines give expression to the desire he feels, together they occasion the ancient custom of wife kissing (from the silent film within the film) that he wants to . . . modernize. To what does the "that" in his translation refer?-hurrah for that little difference. No doubt, to her little ie that makes him so passionate, and that is so worthy of noting; though no doubt, to everything that makes her different from him. He does and does not know what finally makes her different, for the meaning of the "that" is perpetually available, perpetually changing, and perpetually deferred. It is an object of mortgage and merriment. Of merriment: since the difference adds more to the world by generating hurrahs -that is, passion. The modernization of the ancient Connecti- cut custom of wife kissing is utterable in French because French is, to Hollywood, not only the language of endless romance ("oo la la!") but of liberty also. As in the statue in New York that the French built as a universal image of liberty-a symbol that has come to mean the more the merrier. For America is a land in which a motley crew of immigrants produces vitality through, one hopes, variety, including variety in physiognomy and language (even if their variegations are fast disappearing under the influence, in part, of films). Adam's Rib is a film about liberation in French, meaning liberation that has the effect of producing desire, a desire that, having allowed difference to be, can then succeed in identifying it and translating it into its own terms, its own intentions, its own language. Difference and desire are correlative terms, different in meaning, of course, but each totally embroiled in the other's constitution. It is in this space of uncertaintyuncertainty about what is a little difference and what is a big one, about the significance of differences, big and little, for human practice and human imagination, about the significance of practices in the construction of such differences as big or little -that openness resides: a space of expectation, but also of the expectation of being confounded in one's expectations. In that space resides the capacity to generalize without stereotyping, to picture without reducing, to listen without predicting, and finally to bear all the hell that is breaking loose. Such is the space of citizenship in a nation whose liberty requires the acknowledgment of diversity.
Happy ending? Evidently. But note that, in the film, the question of who is different from whom and, above all, the significance of such differences is left unaccounted. As it must be. For once the letter of the law that decrees essentialized differences on the basis of anatomical microappendages is stripped bare, it is no longer clear what a man is, or what a woman is, or who can inhabit what role when, or what a role is or should or will become. These differences, no longer magnified, are small, and Adam, having been cut down to size, now knows himself to be of the same size as Amanda. "Hey," he says to her as they are settling into their farm, "you were good back there . . . especially in the summation, ya had me. " She is about to have him again, but in celebration rather than conflict.
Which also shows that difference is insignificant apart from its modes of valuation, apart from the significance we attach to its attachments. Indeed it is through desire that we construct the size, import, and quality of difference. Again, if difference is the object of passion, conversely if passion is a route to making difference acknowledgeable and livable, difference and passion do not exactly lead to clear knowledge. We do not know, neither does this pair know, how each differs from the other. The task of public life, and of private marriages, is to unravel such similarities and differences by conversing about them, working them out, discovering them, and by finding that, as over time categories of gender fall away, men and women both do and do not actually become different in ways we may not expect. With no help in sight, she hails a taxi. As she gets in, not without trepidation, she is greeted by Richard, the taxi driver and general trickster/factotum, to whom she introduces herself as "Miss Jessica" (as in: "Miss Jessica to the likes of you"). He smiles his ironic smile and proceeds to deliver her to her homeby way of the various downtown taxi stops he is making for his other passengers.
In the course of this downtown route ( Jessica would seldom find herself in such a chaotic and newly multiracial part of the city, since she remains holed up in her formerly white and still white suburb, a place called "Parktown"), the taxi is kidnapped to Soweto, where the fun (hell) begins. Expecting that her matronly voice still carries immediate authority, she tells the kidnapper in no uncertain terms to behave properly, and the instruction receives a most unexpected reply, which she can, fortunately for her, not understand, since it is not in a language she understands. This will be the first of many unexpected responses, each of which will undercut the sense of comfortable command that she and her husband are accus-
tomed to hold over all manner of natives, who were, after all, in the days of apartheid, not even South African citizens.
Meanwhile, the husband, in charge of negotiating a strike by his black African workers, remains unreachable by her: he greets her call from a fancy Soweto shebeen (named, not uninterestingly, Satchmo's) with the remark that she should not bother him when he is at work, and he follows that dismissal with a swift click of the phone. Unable to get home by calling for help, she is forced to rely on Richard, to rely on him so completely that, when he briefly loses sight of her, she collapses with anxiety. She is, after all, alone in a township where she does not want to be, and where she is the object of many a male eye, if not male
proposition. This state of affairs disturbs her sense of self and authority (self as authority) to the point where, when Richard returns, she beats him with her fists and then collapses in tears into his arms, a lost child dependent on his wiles and his good nature. If this scene is not a representation of reversal, of becoming, to one's horror and distaste, the slave to the slave, then nothing is. Mr. Du Toit fares no better, if not worse, for, on returning home, he finds a message on his answering machine from Richard, inquiring after Jessica's safe return -but in a fatal idiom: "Jessica baby, this is Richard. I'm at Satchmo's." Assuming the worst, that his wife is having it off with a black African, he settles down into the night, drinks too much, manages to get himself locked out of his house and nearly arrested by his own security company while trying to break back in. His appropriately violent dog, leftover and symbol of white security from the old days, manages to take a nice bite out of his hand in the process. Later, searching for Satchmo's (which he has no idea how to find and wrongly assumes is in a seedy part of downtown Johannesburg), his car is stolen, he gets even more impossibly drunk, and ends up sleeping in a nearby flea-bitten hotel, where, since he relinquished his wallet to local beggars in a moment of dystopia, he cannot pay for the room the next morning. But it is the night before that interests us: sitting in a seedy bar that he had thought might be Satchmo's, watching one of those corny Afrikaanslanguage melodramas with which apartheid overwhelmed South African television, our drunken hero confuses the actors he sees on the tele with himself and his wife. He sees (or thinks he sees) Jessica going off with Richard, and he hears (or thinks he hears) Richard speaking directly to him off the TV screen and, with a grin, saying: "Welcome to the new South Africa."
Taxi to Soweto is obviously a film about white fears. Played out as a collapse in spatial borders that under apartheid reflected and defined essentialized differences, the character of Mr. Du Toit is swallowed whole by a city whose new in-between spaces he has developed no skills to negotiate. He has failed to ask anyone where Satchmo's is, anyone who might actually know: he has failed, in other words, to ask a black person, and has instead looked for the to-him mysterious place on his own. Still the settler, able to take control, is he. He at last Herwitz • Peace and Mind finds out where Satchmo's is wholly by accident, through the black African negotiator who is trying to resolve the strike, and Du Toit thereby discovers that black people just might be of help in situations that he cannot himself handle. This discovery, shattering to his sense of mastery, is the discovery of his dependence on the slave, of his being slave to the slave, of finding that the slave has a skill: the slave knows where things are in the wider world and knows how to negotiate the cracks between identities in ways that the master does not. It is the slave who can drive the taxis that take people between here and there.
"Only if you find out what it is like to be a worker, without enough wherewithal, can you understand what the strikers are about," the negotiator more or less tells Mr. Du Toit. His wife will make the same discovery-not in Soweto, but in front of the gate to the house of her husband's boss. Having traveled to Johannesburg, again in the ubiquitous taxi, with some wives of the men on strike, and having heard their side of the story, Jessica finds herself in the middle of the chanting and toyi-toying they are doing outside the boss's house to attract attention to their cause, and also finds herself annoyed at the immediate police clampdown on them. Convinced that she can talk some sense into these policemen as one Afrikaaner to another, the good Frau goes over to explain that these women are protesting peacefully. Her expectation is that the "misunderstanding" will be cleared up and the police will go away. Instead, it is she who is taken away-to a But Taxi to Soweto is a white film, and there is no true African reversal that occurs in it; consequently, the white reversal only goes so far. But better herein the world of comedy, where fear can be bearable -than nowhere, ever. The failure to extend the comic reversal is, I think, related to the fact that, in spite of its disruptions of norm, procedure, and law, the film does not, finally, reflect on itself (Adam's Rib does so -for example, through its use of the silent film within the film). Only at the end of Taxi to Soweto is there a moment of selfreferentiality. Van Rensburg the director appears, a fat man like Hitchcock, and
signals the final cut. This gesture of ending the film feels gratuitous; it is a wasted opportunity for self-reflection. Were there self-reflection of a more penetrating kind, the filmmaker might have realized that what self-reflection there is is one sided. The question of who the black Africans are, of how they react to the precipitous events of the city and the nation, of their trajectories of change, might have been more interestingly raised. A deeper sort of conversation between black and white might have happened. But that might have been too much to ask for, and too soon. In South Africa people remain, today, wary when speaking outside their "group"-wary if not sullen, if not violent. Which is also why the roads are so perilous, especially between Johannesburg and Soweto.
But the utopian moment in this film, also its most classically comic, is an ending defined as happy because a painful history is resolved in, not love, but liking. It is the film's eliding the problem of likeness (of people becoming more alike, recognizing their lines of similarity) with that of people liking each other that is, especially in South Africa, utopian. For it would be far easier to manage diversity if people liked each other more often; that is, more than they do. What is difficult, perhaps most difficult, is for people to form strategic relationships, negotiate particular forms of reconciliation, learn to respect each other, when they do not like each other. They must come, little by little, to like each other more, and must do so especially when they have no sense that things will change dramatically in the short term. The problems both of achieving desire and of achieving sufficient likeness stubbornly remain. Those failures of achievement, in many ways the condition of post-apartheid South Africa, are not funny, and certainly not comic in the Dantean sense. Yet the film gives way in the end to rainbow images of complementarity, as mysteriously produced as the glorious music from Satchmo's.
Taxi to Soweto was made before it became clear to the nation (toward the close of the 1990s) that crime, unemployment, HIV/AIDS, bad government, lack of genuine multiparty democracy, corruption, scandal, HIV/AIDS, and again, HIV/AIDS had subdued the utopianism that fuels reconciliation and, by corollary, reversal. Reversal, and the larger ambit of reconciliation, are today stalled in this mire, even if, perhaps, the work of addressing such problems might just produce a new kind of likeness between persons. After all, Voltaire's Candide ends with a reconciliation of characters in a state of extreme unhappiness: characters unhappy, until they begin to realize that they share utopian and prophetic images of happy endings that must give way to the more realistic goals of producing candied fruits and pleasant drinks through cooperative, hard labor. That work turns out to be the only thing that allows them to find each other bearable. It makes them more alike, almost makes them like each other, and produces its own kind of complementarity. Everything hangs on the capacity of this, perhaps any, society to address what is no longer of the domain of screwball comedy.
